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Abstract 
Diagnostic information allows an agent to predict the state of nature about the success of an 
investment project better than the prior. We analyze the optimal pricing scheme for selling 
diagnostic information to buyers with different, privately known, ex ante success probability. 
Investment costs and returns of successful projects are assumed to be the same for all buyers. 
The value of diagnostic information is the difference in expected payoffs with and without it, and 
we show that the willingness to pay for diagnostic information is non monotonic in the ex ante 
success probability.  When the information seller can offer only one quality level, and negative 
payments are not allowed, we find that the optimal menu of (linear) contracts is remarkably 
simple. A pure royalty is offered to buyers with low ex ante success probability and a pure fixed 
fee is offered to buyers with high ex ante success probability.  
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1. Introduction 
It is good management practice to acquire information before committing the firm to an 
important decision or a major investment. External sources of such information include 
marketing and strategic consultants, legal advisors, IT consultants, financial research firms, 
auditors, and the growing number of information services companies that offer electronic access 
to proprietary databases. Individuals also solicit information from a variety of sources before 
taking important decisions. For instance, buyers of used cars sometimes invest in a diagnostic 
check by a trusted mechanic or acquire online information about the specific model and the 
history of the vehicle from a service such as Carfax.  Other examples include property evaluation 
by real estate experts, medical advice and legal counsel.   
This paper analyzes how to price diagnostic information, which is defined as information that is: 
(1) valuable for making decisions, and (2) unbundled from physical objects, services and 
execution.  In some cases, diagnostic information comes bundled with execution. For instance, 
doctors, IT consultants and management consultants are typically paid for both diagnosing the 
problem and also solving it.  Similarly, many accounting and audit products both scan for errors 
and also rectify them. We do not deal with these cases here. In a seminal paper, Arrow (1962) 
modeled (diagnostic) information as a signal that changes the estimates of the probabilities of the 
different states of nature, allowing an informed agent to make better decisions. Arrow’s work 
provides a crucial insight: diagnostic information has economic value only insofar the decision 
maker changes his actions as a consequence of the revised probabilities in at least one state of the 
world.1   
From a practical viewpoint, how information services are priced is important.  Selling 
information that is later used in decision making is a growing business (Jensen, 1991). 
Professional consulting services are exemplars of the growing importance of the diagnostic 
information market, which has increased at more than 10% a year during the 80s. Marketing 
research consultants have got the lion share of the industry. The top 50 US market research firms 
                                                 
1 Information, in addition to affecting the estimates of the probabilities of the different states of nature, can also help 
identify new alternatives that were unknown a priori. Although this is an important component of the value of 
information, scholars have tended to disregard it because of the difficulty to put a value on a priori non-existing 
states of nature. In this paper we will follow in this tradition and focus on information as modifying estimated 
probabilities of known states of the world. 
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reported worldwide revenues of $5.96 billion in 1998. Market research analysts held about 
135000 jobs in the US in 2002, with employment expected to grow by more than 36% through 
2012 (http://www.bls.gov). Market research firms provide clients information to decide on the 
promotion, distribution, design, and pricing of products or services. Marketing information may 
also be used in decisions such as adding new product lines or opening new branches. Other 
examples of diagnostic information include opinion services by portfolio analysts, legal 
counseling without further representation, patent validity or patent infringement opinion by 
lawyers.2 For simplicity, in what follows we shall simply use information to mean diagnostic 
information.  
To focus on how pricing is affected by the value of information, we develop a simple model 
where an agent has to decide whether to invest or not in a project with an uncertain outcome and 
can purchase information that will update his beliefs about the outcome.  The value of 
information is the difference in expected payoffs with and without it. Information buyers are 
assumed to be heterogeneous in the ex ante success probability. We show that the value of 
information is non monotonic in the ex ante success probability. Indeed, information is more 
valuable to buyers who have the highest a priori uncertainty between investing or not in the 
project.   
We then analyze the optimal pricing for a monopolist offering a single information quality. Our 
model’s simplifying features, namely that all buyers invest the same amount (if they invest) and 
receive the same payoff (if the project is successful) imply that we can restrict ourselves to linear 
contracts.  The optimal menu of contracts is remarkably simple. If negative payments are not 
allowed, a pure royalty is offered to buyers with low ex ante success probability and a pure fixed 
fee is offered to buyers with high ex ante success probability. The fact that the optimal menu of 
contracts collapses to only two contracts is due to both the linearity of contracts and the 
piecewise linearity of the value of information. To grasp the intuition behind our finding, notice 
that whereas a pure fixed fee implies that the payment for the information is independent of the 
ex ante expected value of the project, a royalty means that the payment is contingent to the 
success of the project and therefore increasing in its ex ante expected value. A contingent 
                                                 
2 Firms often consult patent lawyers to assess whether their product infringes another’s patent, or if another patent is 
valid, or both.  The lawyers that provide such opinions are almost always not employed by the firm, and moreover, 
typically will not represent the firm if the latter is sued for patent infringement (Lemley and Tangri, 2003). 
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payment is therefore especially ill-suited to capture value from buyers with high ex ante expected 
value projects, for whom information is not that important.  
The simplicity of the optimal menu of contracts has important practical implications. It explains 
why we do not observe complex pricing schemes for selling information. Managers do not have 
to search for elaborate and complex formulae; instead, they need focus only on finding the 
optimal values for the royalty and fixed fee. Of course, these implications apply to those 
information markets whose reality approximates the special features of our model.  
For simplicity, we ignore whether the information is sold as a service or embodied in a software 
or hardware diagnostic tool, which may affect whether the buyer can “resell” the information to 
others.  The way in which information is sold may also affect the cost structure of the seller.  We 
follow the literature in assuming that the marginal cost of serving an additional buyer is zero.   
In the next section, we position our paper in the context of the related literature. Section 3 
derives the value of diagnostic information. Section 4 analyzes optimal pricing in the basic 
model with homogenous information, whereas section 5 explores the robustness of the basic 
result to extensions and generalizations. Section 6 concludes the paper. The Appendix contains 
the proofs. 
 
2. Related Literature 
This paper is related to several streams of the managerial and economic literature. Within the 
information marketing literature, the papers closest to ours are Iyer and Soberman (1997) and 
Chang and Jevons Lee (1994), which analyze the optimal selling and pricing policies for a 
marketing consultant who sells information that increases the value of the downstream products. 
Since buyers’ characteristics are common knowledge (an assumption we relax in our paper) the 
consultant can extract the full value of information from each buyer. However, since buyers 
interact in the product market, their willingness to pay depends upon which other buyers also 
have the information. Thus, the optimal pricing scheme consists of selecting the subset of buyers 
to whom to sell information. By contrast, we ignore interactions in the downstream market and 
focus on information that is non-rival and can be used by several buyers without loss of value. 
Formally, we assume that the values that buyers derive from information are independent. This 
implies that our analysis does not directly apply to cases where exclusive access to the 
information is an advantage. In turn, our paper derives the value of information from the 
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underlying characteristics of the investment project and generates greater insights about the 
contractual mechanisms upon which a market for information is based. 
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that has explicitly modeled diagnostic information 
is Sarvary (2002). He looks at the market for second opinions and analyzes competition between 
information sellers. He assumes that the sellers are differentiated in that they offer information 
with different levels of precision and shows that there is an equilibrium in which the low quality 
seller sells first and then (depending on the signal received) the buyer can buy the high quality 
information with some probability. Differently from our paper, he assumes common knowledge 
about the buyer’s willingness to pay for the information and does not deal with pricing issues. 
Competition among information sellers is also analyzed by Sarvary and Parker (1997) in a game-
theoretic model that consists of two firms selling information to a population of buyers who are 
heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for information quality. They analyze how the nature of 
competition is affected by the reliability of information and the correlation between different 
sources of information. As we do, they assume that there are no interactions in the downstream 
market. Unlike us, however, they ignore the possibility of offering a menu of contracts to buyers. 
In sum, within the information marketing literature, our paper is the first to analyze the optimal 
pricing mechanism for selling diagnostic information to heterogeneous buyers with privately 
known ex ante values for the information.3 
Pricing issues have been also addressed by the recent literature on “information products” or 
“digital products”. Sundararajan (2004) analyzes optimal pricing of digital goods under 
incomplete information when both fixed fee and royalty pricing are feasible. He shows that 
offering fixed fee pricing in addition to a usage-based pricing scheme is always (weakly) profit-
improving. Jain and Kannan (2002) examine various pricing schemes for information products 
sold online. They look at three common pricing schemes for access to proprietary databases: 
connect-time-based pricing, search-based pricing and subscription pricing. They show that 
search-based pricing is typically preferred to connect-time-based pricing, and that subscription 
pricing might be used in combination with search-based pricing when the value of information 
varies across users. Although, similar in spirit, our paper differs in three important aspects. First, 
we focus on the pricing of information in the Arrow sense: Information that is unbundled from 
                                                 
3 Raju and Roy (2000) use a game-theoretic model to study how industry characteristics moderate the effect of 
market information on firm profits. 
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physical objects or services, whose value derives solely from improved decision making. 
Second, we derive the value of information, whereas they assign it. Third, we identify and 
characterize the optimal menu of contracts for the information seller, whereas they simply 
compare different pricing schemes.4  
 
3. A model for diagnostic information 
Consider a consulting company (the consultant) selling reports to clients (the buyers) who use 
these reports to make decisions about investment projects.5 Each buyer can only undertake one 
project, by investing a fixed amount I.  Projects can either be good (G) or bad (B).  A G project 
generates a (gross) return of V > 0, whereas a B project generates a return of 0.  There is an ex 
ante probability q that a given project is of type G, and 1 – q that is of type B.   
An important ingredient of our model is that buyers are heterogeneous. We assume that buyers, 
indexed by q, are distributed according to the distribution function F(q). We also assume that the 
support of F(q) is compact, f(q) is the density function and that [ ]1,0∈q .  The consultant does not 
observe q, which could reflect unobserved differences in the buyer’s ability or unobserved 
differences in the market conditions facing the buyer, but does observe its distribution F. One 
interpretation of q is as follows.  Suppose firms use heuristics to screen projects to cull less 
promising ones.  Projects are indexed by the probability of success, p, which has a distribution 
h(p). If a firm is able to screen out and reject projects with p < p*, then ∫= 1
*
)(
p
dppphq  is the 
conditional expectation of the success probability associated with the set of projects that survive 
                                                 
4 There are other related papers as well, albeit with a very different focus. For example, Bashyan (2000) analyzes 
duopolistic competition in the supply of information products, but focuses on the selection of the distribution 
channel – online versus CD-ROM, rather than the pricing mechanisms.  Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) examine 
whether firms should bundle different information goods and charge one bundle price. 
5 The assumption of a monopolist information seller implies that there is a high fixed cost for acquiring and 
processing proprietary information and a negligible marginal cost for information dissemination. For instance, IMS 
International, a subsidiary set up by Dun & Bradstreet in 1954, is the leading supplier of proprietary information 
about the sales of pharmaceutical and other health care products (Chang and Jevons Lee, 1994). 
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the screening process.  Heterogeneity in the ability of the firms to screen out projects is 
represented by p*.6 
For instance, in the case of marketing research information, V could be the net benefit of 
launching a new product, I the cost of adding a new line to the existing product offer, and q the 
ex ante probability that the new product will be successfully accepted by the final consumers. 
Without new information, a buyer invests if qV > I. Information produces a signal about the type 
of the project (see table 1).  After observing the signal, the buyer updates his beliefs and decides 
whether to invest or not.   
Table 1: Modeling diagnostic information 
 Good project (G) Bad project (B) 
Positive signal (Y) Pr(Y|G) Pr(Y|B) 
Negative signal (N) Pr(N|G) Pr(N|B) 
Let Pr(Y|G) = m > 0.5 and Pr(N|B) = n > 0.5. Hence Pr(N|G) = (1–m) and Pr(Y|B) = (1–n).  An 
N signal conditional on a G project is also referred to as a “false negative”, whereas a Y signal 
conditional on a B project is typically called a “false positive”. Notice that the “quality” of the 
information is given by m and n.  Larger values of m and n imply a smaller probability of false 
negative and false positive, i.e., the signal is more reliable.  Using Baye’s Law, the probability 
that the project is of type G given a Y signal and given q is ( ) ( )( )nqmq mqqYG −−+= 11,Pr , and 
the probability that the project is of type G given an N signal and given q is 
( ) ( )( ) ( )nqqm qmqNG −+− −= 11 1,Pr .7 
                                                 
6 Alternatively, one can assume that the source of heterogeneity across buyers is V, the gross return of a successful 
project, which yields qualitatively similar results, but is analytical less tractable. 
7 The quality or accuracy of the information (m and n) is assumed to be exogenous; the content of the information, 
i.e., the probability of getting a Y signal does depend upon q.  If one treats q itself as a random variable, then it 
follows that the signal and q are correlated.  Specifically, Pr(Y|q) = mq + (1-n)q,  and if q is assumed to be uniform 
between [0,1], then Pr(Y) = m/2 +(1-n)/2, so that Cov(Y, q) = (m+n-1)/12 > 0.  If q is treated as non-stochastic, then 
the distribution of the signal depends on q.  This dependence does not raise any problems because the contracting 
takes place before the consultant observes any signal. Thus, at the time of contracting, the consultant has no 
additional information about q. 
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3.1. The value of information: Non-monotonicity 
The value of information for a given buyer is the difference between his expected profits with 
information and his expected profits without it.  Differences in q translate in differences in the 
private benefit of information.  However, as we shall see, higher q buyers do not necessarily 
benefit the most from having the information.  Since information has value insofar as it changes 
decisions, we need to consider two separate cases depending on whether the buyer would have 
invested or not without information. 
Case 1: IqV ≥ , the buyer invests even without information. 
In this case, the buyer values information because it reduces the probability of a bad investment 
decision.  Given that m > 0.5, the buyer invests only if there is a Y signal, so that the expected 
profit is Pr(G|Y,q)Pr(Y|q)(V – I) +  Pr(B|Y,q)Pr(Y|q)(– I), whereas the expected profit without 
information is )( IqV − . The difference between the two is the value of information, i.e., 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]InmVmqnIIqVInqIVqmqW 11)()(11)( −++−−=−−−−−+−= . Notice that W(q) is 
equal to zero at ( ) 2)1(1 qInmmV
nIq =−++−= .  For any 2qq > , Pr(B|N,q) V – I ≥ 0, so that even 
an N signal does not change the buyer’s action (invest), and therefore information is valueless to 
such buyers.  
Case 2: IqV < , the buyer does not invest without information. 
The value of information is given by ( ) ( )( ) )(11)( InqIVqmqW −−−+−= .  (In this case the 
expected profit of the buyer without information is zero.)  One can rewrite this expression as 
( )[ ]InmmVqInqW 1)1()( −+−+−−= . Notice that W(q) is equal to zero at 1)1(
)1( q
nmmV
Inq =−+−
−= .  
For any 1qq < , Pr(G|Y,q)V – I ≤ 0, so that even a Y signal does not change the buyer’s action 
(not invest) and therefore information is valueless to such buyers. 
Figure 1 shows graphically the value of information. The intuition behind this graph is the 
following.  For q ≥ I/V, W(q) represents the saving in investment costs, nI(1-q), minus the loss 
from a false negative (relative to the baseline of “invest”), (1-m)(V-I)q.  For this range of 
parameter values, the buyer values information because it could prevent (with some probability) 
a bad investment. As q rises, the cost of a false negative rises and the saving in investment cost 
decreases.  For Case 2, W(q) represents the gain from investing (the baseline is “not invest”), 
mq(V-I), minus the loss from a false positive, (1-n)(1-q)I. Notice that the gain is increasing in q 
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and the cost of a false positive is decreasing in q. In this range, the buyer values information 
because it could suggest (with some probability) that investing is a good decision. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Proposition 1:  The value of information is non monotonic in q.  It increases in q for q ≤ I/V and 
decreases in q thereafter. 
This is an intuitive result.8 Information is more valuable to buyers who have the highest a priori 
uncertainty between investing or not in the project. Buyers who have either a highly negative or 
a highly positive ex ante expected value of the project are less likely to change their actions as a 
consequence of the revised probabilities, and hence, will pay less for the information.  Inasmuch 
as options are a substitute for information, this result is also consistent with the conventional 
finding that the value of an option increases with the variance of the underlying asset’s value 
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
Remark 1: The value of information is strictly increasing in both m and n, decreasing in V and 
increasing in I if q > I/V, increasing in V and decreasing in I if q < I/V. Additionally, the value of 
information is strictly increasing in γ, where γ is a scale factor that multiplies both V and I. 
More precise information is more valuable. Also, when the underlying decision is more 
important (i.e., higher V and I) then information is more valuable.  
Remark 2: For q > I/V , dW(q)/dm > dW(q)/dn, and for q < I/V, dW(q)/dm < dW(q)/dn. 
In other words, all buyers on the right of I/V (see Figure 1) are relatively more concerned with 
the probability of a false negative, whereas all buyers on the left of I/V are relatively more 
concerned with the probability of a false positive. Indeed, for q > I/V the baseline is to invest. 
These buyers are going to change their actions only if they observe an N signal. Hence, they 
would like the N signal be as precise as possible, i.e., the probability of a false negative, 
Pr(N|G)=1 – m, to be small. 
 
4. Optimal pricing of diagnostic information 
We assume that the consultant offers only one information quality and that such a quality is 
observable to the buyers. We discuss relaxing the first assumption in section 5, and briefly 
                                                 
8 The standard assumption in the literature on price discrimination (see Tirole, 1988; Ch. 2) is that the willingness to 
pay of the buyers is a monotonic function of their “type”. As we show here, this assumption is implausible for 
diagnostic information.  
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discuss the latter here. In some cases, observing the quality of information may not be difficult. 
For instance, information might be embodied in a specific piece of equipment or research 
technology whose characteristics are well understood. In other cases, although the quality of 
information is not directly observable, legal or reputation reasons might produce a similar effect. 
However, when the production of information involves human judgment based on expertise or 
experience (e.g., management advice) the quality of information is more difficult to assess. This 
case raises adverse selection problems. In addition, the consultant can also have incentives to 
distort the information, if he is also involved in fixing the diagnosed problem or if (as is the case 
here) he receives a contingent payment. In this paper, we abstract from these important problems 
in information economics (Arrow, 1962; Emons, 1997; Dye and Sridhar, 2003). 
Menu of contracts: We assume that contracts are offered to buyers before the signal is observed 
and can include payments contingent on whether the project succeeds or not.  Given that q is not 
observed by the consultant, any contract can either have a fixed payment or one that is 
contingent on success or both.  Since every buyer has the same V and I, together these 
observations imply that any contract can be represented as a linear contract that combines a fixed 
fee and a payment contingent on success, i.e., royalties. Hence, let a contract be defined by the 
pair { }βα , , where α represents a fixed fee and β represents a royalty.  We model the royalty as a 
share β of project’s (gross) returns, V, paid only if the project succeeds.9 A pure fixed price 
contract and a pure royalty contract are therefore defined as { }0,α  and { }β,0 , respectively.  A 
pure fixed price means that the payment for the information does not vary with q. A royalty 
implies that the payment for the information is an increasing function of q.  Hence, low q buyers 
tend to prefer a royalty scheme, whereas high q buyers tend to prefer a fixed price. Moreover, a 
royalty is especially ill-suited to capture value from high q buyers since for these buyers the 
                                                 
9 If investment decisions were observable, then contracts could also specify payments contingent on investment 
taking place. Notice that investment occurs with probability mq + (1-n)(1-q). Hence, for any given royalty t and a 
fixed price λ, each potential buyer q would pay λ + (1-n)tI + q(m+n-1)tI. However, this can be replicated with an 
appropriate two-part tariff, α = λ + (1-n)tI  and β = (m+n-1)tI/Vm. A qualitatively similar alternative is to model 
outcome contingent contracts as profit sharing contracts where the consultant gets a share of the net returns, V – I. 
All contingent payment schemes create incentives for the consultant to distort information, a possibility we assume 
away. 
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value of information is decreasing in q.  We assume throughout the paper that α and β are non-
negative.10 Figure 2 shows an arbitrary fixed fee and an arbitrary royalty. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
A menu of contracts is a set of such pairs { }βα , , possibly one for each q. We first characterize 
the optimal menu of contracts and then we compute it under a special case. Note that the 
characterization of the optimal menu of contracts does not rely on any assumption about F(q), 
the distribution of q.  First, it is useful to establish the following two properties of the optimal 
menu of contracts. 
Lemma 1. Let { })(),( qq βα , +ℜ∈)(),( qq βα , be the contract designed for buyer q.  
a) Then, for any q’ > q, )'()( qq αα ≤  and )'()( qq ββ ≥ . 
b) [CONCAVITY] Take 321 ,, qqq  such that 21321 )1(, qqqqq λλ −+=<  with 10 ≤≤ λ . Then, 
[ ] [ ] 333222111 )()()()()1()()( mVqqqmVqqqmVqqq βαβαλβαλ +≤+−++ . 
Lemma 1 implies that the amount of payments that the consultant can extract with an optimal 
menu of contracts must be an increasing and concave function of q. Buyers with larger ex ante 
expected values of the project would be asked to pay a higher price. 
Proposition 2 [Characterization of the optimal menu of contracts]. If +ℜ∈βα ,  then the 
optimal menu of contracts consists of the following two contracts: a pure royalty { }1;0 β  and a 
pure fixed price { }0;2α . { }1;0 β  is chosen by all ( )[ ]2111 ,~),( αββ qqq ∈  and { }0;2α  is chosen by all 
( ])(),,(~ 2221 ααβ qqq ∈ , where InmVm Inq )1()1( )1()( 111 −+−−
−= ββ , InmVm
nIq
)1()1(
)( 222 −++−
−= αα  
and 
mV
q
1
2
21 ),(~ β
ααβ = . 
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal menu of contracts. The intuitive argument of why the optimal 
menu of contracts collapses to only two contracts is as follows. Let *1q  and 
*
2q  be the highest and 
the lowest q that buy the information. Given that α, β > 0, each contract defines a straight line 
with (weakly) positive intercept and slope. Consider the two lines that correspond to the 
                                                 
10 Negative prices are typically not observed in practice and raise a number of difficulties. For instance, if the 
consultant pays a buyer to use the diagnostic information and the latter only pays if they invest (or succeed), this 
may attract fraud; even those without any investment project would claim to be buyers, thereby hoping to get paid 
by the consultant. 
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contracts offered respectively to *1q  and 
*
2q  . Due to incentive compatibility, these two lines 
mark the upper bound of what can be extracted from any buyer ( )*2*1 ,qqq ∈ . The consultant 
cannot obtain higher profits by offering other (different) contracts to the rest of the buyers. 
Hence, the optimal menu of contracts has only two contracts. It is now simple to see why these 
two contracts must be a pure royalty and a pure fixed fee. Suppose that instead of a fixed fee the 
consultant uses a two-part tariff to extract value from *2q . This contract would mark an upper 
bound of what can be extracted from any *2qq <  that is below that defined by a fixed fee 
contract. This would reduce the possibilities of value extraction, and cannot therefore be optimal. 
A similar argument could be put forward for the pure royalty contract. Finally, notice that the 
finding that high q buyers are charged a fixed fee and low q buyers are charged a royalty is rather 
intuitive too. Indeed, whereas a fixed fee implies that the payment for the information is 
independent of the ex ante expected value of the project, a royalty means that the payment is 
contingent to the success of the project and therefore increasing in its ex ante expected value. A 
contingent payment is therefore especially ill-suited to capture value from buyers with high ex 
ante expected value projects, for whom information is not that important. The result in 
Proposition 2 depends upon key elements of our model: a) the value of information is non 
monotonic in q; b) buyers do not choose how much to invest in the project and all successful 
projects have the same return, so that the value of information is (piecewise) linear in q; c) the 
consultant can offer only one quality level; d) negative payments are disallowed. In section 5 we 
discuss the robustness of Proposition 2. 
This finding has important practical implications. It suggests that when restricted to linear 
contracts, the design of the optimal menu of contracts is rather simple. It suffices to offer to the 
buyers the choice between a royalty-based contract and a fixed fee contract, and let the buyers 
self-select. Buyers with low ex ante expected value of the project (who also care more about 
false positives) would choose the royalty-based contract, whereas buyers with high ex ante 
expected value of the project (who also care more about false negatives) would choose the fixed 
fee contract. Hence, the optimization problem of the consultant collapses to the choice of suitable 
values for the royalty and the fixed fee.  
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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One can write the consultant’s profits as follows: 
( )
( )
dqqfdqqmVqf
q
q
q
q
M )()(
21
11
22
21
,~
)(
)(
,~
21∫ ∫+=Π
αβ
β
α
αβ
αβ . 
where 
InmVm
Inq
)1()1(
)1()(
1
11 −+−−
−= ββ , InmVm
nIq
)1()1(
)( 222 −++−
−= αα  and 
( )
mV
q
1
2
21,~ β
ααβ = . Solving for the first order conditions one can compute the optimal value of 
1β  and 2α , provided one knows the distribution of q and the values of V and I.11  
Remark 3 [Comparative statics]. Let q be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, then 
0,0 21 >∂
∂>∂
∂
VV
αβ , 0,0 21 <∂
∂<∂
∂
II
αβ , 0,0 21 >∂
∂=∂
∂
γ
α
γ
β , where γ is a scale factor that multiplies 
both V and I. 
The comparative statics with respect to γ is easily understood if one thinks at a change in γ as a 
change in the unit of measure of both V and I. Whereas the fixed price, also measured in 
monetary units, should change accordingly, the royalty, being a share, should not be affected. 
Remark 4 [Comparative statics: quality of information]. Let q be uniformly distributed 
between 0 and 1, then 0,0 21 >∂
∂>∂
∂
mm
αβ , 0,0 21 >∂
∂>∂
∂
nn
αβ . Let m+n=constant, then 
0,0 21 <∂
∂<∂
∂
mm
αβ . 
As expected, information of better quality commands both a higher fixed fee and a higher royalty 
in the optimal menu of contracts. However, if one keeps constant the overall quality of the signal 
(i.e., the sum of false positives and false negatives is held constant) then information with a 
lower false positive rate is sold through a menu of contracts that involves a larger fixed fee and a 
larger royalty. The reason for this finding comes from two arguments. First, for any acceptable 
royalty the optimal fixed fee is increasing in the level of the royalty since the residual demand is 
less elastic. Indeed, if the royalty is high there are few buyers that switch to the royalty if the 
consultant increases the fixed fee. Second, low q buyers tend to prefer a royalty and are relatively 
more concerned with the probability of a false positive. So, if the false positive rate decreases 
                                                 
11 For instance, let q be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, V=$4m and I=$1m. The probability of a false 
positive and that of a false negative are both 20%. Then, the optimal menu of contracts is formed by a royalty of 
35.4% and a fixed fee of $247400. The expected profits for the consultant will amount to $80000 per buyer. 
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these buyers would obtain higher value from the information, and the consultant would optimally 
increase the level of the royalty, which in turn would imply a higher fixed fee too. 
 
5. Robustness and Model Extensions 
We briefly discuss here the assumptions that lead to the major finding of this paper, that is the 
optimal menu of contracts to sell diagnostic information is composed of two simple contracts, 
one contingent royalty for low q buyers and a fixed fee for high q buyers.12 
First, notice that we have assumed that both the royalty and the fixed fee must take non-negative 
values. If one removes this assumption then it is easy to show that the optimal menu of contracts 
allows full value extraction and it is formed by two two-part tariff contracts.  Indeed, by 
precisely fine tuning the royalty and the fixed fee one can design a contract that coincides with 
the value of information for all q < I/V and another contract that does the same for all q > I/V.  
As noted earlier, allowing money transfers from the consultant to the buyer is unrealistic and 
creates perverse incentives for buyers. 
Second, contracts are linear in q because V and I are constant across buyers.  Linear contracts are 
standard in the literature and also corresponds to the common practice in the industry.  
Third, the linearity of the value of information in q is critical for our results. The literature has 
most often analyzed models where the value of information is assumed to be concave in the 
buyer’s type. Maintaining the non monotonicity result, let W(q) be continuous, twice-
differentiable and concave between 1q  and 2q  with a unique maximum at q = I/V and 
0)()( 21 == qWqW . Under the assumption that both the royalty and the fixed fee cannot take 
negative values, it is easy to see that the highest and the lowest q that buy the information will be 
offered a pure royalty and a pure fixed fee (one can actually perform the same type of reasoning 
provided in the intuition of Proposition 2). Depending on the slope of the value of information, 
these two contracts might again turn out to be the only two contracts available in the optimal 
menu. However, there exist parameter configurations under which one can show that for a 
compact and closed set of q (strictly smaller than *2q ) the consultant offers a continuum of two-
part tariff contracts, each of them tangent to the value of information. 
                                                 
12 For the algebra, see our working paper at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/wpapers/detail.jsp?id=4364. 
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Since we do not assume the value of information, but we derive it from the underlying decision 
framework, it is important to understand how one could obtain a value of information that is 
concave in q in our model. Notice that we have assumed that information does not affect the 
level of investment, but only whether the investment is actually undertaken or not. The level of 
investment could be a decision variable for the buyer as well. If one assumes that I is a decision 
variable and that V is an increasing concave function of I then the amount invested by a buyer 
depends on q and on the information available to the buyer. Under specific functional forms one 
can show that the value of information is concave and non-monotonic in q. However, in this 
scenario the royalty affects the returns of the investment, and, in turn, how much the buyer will 
invest. So, the royalty has an additional inefficiency absent in our basic model. Finding the 
optimal menu of contracts under this scenario proved intractable. We do not think that this would 
make the optimal menu of contracts necessarily more complex. However, the present model falls 
short of providing a thorough verification of this conjecture that, we hope, will be addressed in 
future research. 
Finally, we assume a single quality of information.  In the literature, typically buyers with higher 
(marginal) willingness to pay receive higher quality (or quantity) of the good or service.  In 
principle, information could be differentiated vertically (i.e., higher or lower overall precision) as 
well as horizontally (i.e., different combinations of false positives and false negatives).  
Differentiated quality heightens the problems of moral hazard on the part of the consultant if the 
quality is not observed by the buyer.  Sarvary (2002) provides a treatment of vertically 
differentiated quality.  Instead, we analyzed the case of horizontally differentiated quality, where 
the consultant offers two different qualities of information, i.e., signals with different 
combinations of m and n, with m+n held constant. Although the optimal menu of contracts 
changes, its main feature remains similar to that obtained in Proposition 2. That is, high q buyers 
will be charged a fixed fee and low q buyers will be charged a pure royalty. For q in between, 
either a fixed fee or a pure royalty may be charged, depending on parameter values. Further, high 
q buyers purchase the signal with the smaller probability of a false negative and low q buyers 
purchase the signal with the smaller probability of a false positive. Obviously, increasing the 
number of different qualities of information available leads to an expansion of the optimal menu 
of contracts, but once again, each element of the optimal menu is either a pure royalty or a pure 
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fixed fee. We conjecture that allowing for more variants will yield similar results: More pricing 
options, but each option being either a pure fixed fee or a pure royalty. 
We have explored the robustness of our result in other ways as well. In an early version of this 
paper we analyzed a specification of the model where buyers’ heterogeneity came through the 
returns of a good project rather than the probability of a good project. This specification is less 
tractable, but nonetheless yields similar results.  
We also analyzed an extension where we have competition among two consultants. When the 
consultants sell identical quality, the standard Bertrand result holds where price competition 
leads to zero profits. However, when the information is differentiated, i.e., each consultant has a 
different combination of m+n, we find that consultants tend to choose different pricing 
mechanisms in order to alleviate competition. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Diagnostic information that simply changes the estimates of the probabilities of the different 
states of nature has economic value if the decision maker would change his actions as a 
consequence of the revised probabilities. However, trading information is not easy and although 
Arrow (1962) envisaged the possibility of information becoming a commodity, he also warned 
about the impediments to markets for information. We do not dispute the existence of such 
problems. However, as the examples such as marketing research, independent financial research, 
and legal advice have shown, there are markets, albeit imperfect, for information. In this paper, 
we have tried to understand how these markets work and, in particular, how information is 
priced.  
We have found that the buyer’s willingness to pay for information is non monotonic in the 
buyer’s “type”, implying that the standard “revelation mechanism” solution cannot be 
mechanically applied. However, the optimal pricing scheme for a monopolist information owner 
turned out to be extremely simple. A pure royalty is offered to buyers whose projects have low 
ex ante expected value and a pure fixed fee is offered to buyers whose projects have high ex ante 
expected value.  
Subject to the caveats discussed earlier, this finding has important practical implications. In 
particular, when diagnostic information affects mainly whether an investment takes place but not 
the size of the investment, so that the value of information is approximately linear, our results 
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suggest that consultants do not need complicated pricing schemes to maximize profits. It suffices 
to offer to the buyers a choice between a royalty-based contract and a fixed fee contract, and let 
the buyers self-select. Buyers with low ex ante expected value of the project would choose the 
royalty-based contract, whereas buyers with high ex ante expected value of the project would 
choose the fixed fee contract. Hence, the optimization problem of the seller collapses to the 
choice of suitable values for the royalty and the fixed fee. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Non monotonicity in the value of information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 : Fixed price and royalty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I (V-I)(m+n-1)/V 
slope=mV-(m+n-1)I 
slope=-(1-m)V-(m+n-1)I 
 q 
W 
q1 q2 I/V 1 0 
q2(β)I/V 0 
W 
q q1 q2 
I (V-I)(m+n-1)/V 
W(q) W(q) 
α 
q1(β)
q2(α) 
βmqV 
q1(α) 1 
 18
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The optimal menu of contracts 
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Appendix: Pricing Diagnostic Information 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Proof of Remark 2. Let m + n = k. For q > I/V,   ( ) ( )[ ]IkVknqnIqW 11)( −+−+−= . Notice 
that 0)( ≤−=∂
∂ qVI
n
qW . For q < I/V, the proof goes in the same direction. QED 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. a) Incentive compatibility implies that mVqqqmVqqq )'()'()()( βαβα +≤+  
and ')'()'(')()( mVqqqmVqqq βαβα +≥+ . Putting together these two inequalities one obtains 
that [ ] [ ])()'(')'()()()'( qqmVqqqqqmVq ββααββ −≥−≥− . Since q’ > q, it must be that 
)()'( qq ββ ≤ . Notice also that [ ] 0)'()()()'( ≥−≥− qqmVqqq ββαα . Hence, )()'( qq αα ≥ . b) 
Incentive compatibility implies that 133111 )()()()( mVqqqmVqqq βαβα +≤+  and 
233222 )()()()( mVqqqmVqqq βαβα +≤+ . Multiply both sides of the inequalities by λ  and λ−1  
respectively, and then sum across them to complete the proof. QED 
 
Proof of Remarks 3 and 4: Numerical simulations available from the authors upon request.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Assume the seller has designed a menu of contracts and call *1q  and 
*
2q  
the values of q such that for all *1qq <  and for all *2qq >  no buyer is interested in purchasing the 
information (given the menu).  
Let { }11; βα  and { }22 ; βα  be the two contracts designed respectively for *1q  and *2q . Notice that 
*
111
*
1 )( mVqqW βα +≥  and that *222*2 )( mVqqW βα +≥ . Consider any [ ]*2*1 , qqq ∈ . Since the 
incentive compatibility constraints must be satisfied, the following inequality has to hold: 
{ }mVqmVqmVqqq 2211 ;min)()( βαβαβα ++≤+ , where { })();( qq βα  is the contract designed 
for buyer q. Otherwise ( )*2*1 , qqq ∈  will choose either { }11; βα  or { }22 ; βα .  
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Call [ ]∫ +=Π
*
2
*
1
)()()(
q
q
M dqqfmVqqq βα  the profit of the seller. Then, the following inequality holds 
{ } ∫∫ ≡⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧≤++≤Π
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
)()(;)(min)(;min *2*
1
*
1
2211
q
q
q
q
M MdqqfqWq
q
qWdqqfmVqmVq βαβα . The last inequality 
is due to *111
*
1 )( mVqqW βα +≥ , which implies mVqqq
mVqq
qq
qqW
11*
1
*
11
*
1
1
*
1
*
1 )( βαβα +≥+≥  (given 
that *1qq ≥ ), and  mVqmVqqW 22*222*2 )( βαβα +≥+≥  (given that qq ≥*2 ). 
Finally, notice that the seller can extract exactly M by offering the following menu of contracts 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ == *
1
*
1
11
)(;0
mVq
qWβα  and { }0);( 2*22 == βα qW . Since MM ≤Π , then there does not exist any 
other menu of contracts for the interval [ ]*2*1 ,qq  such that buyer’s profits are larger.  Finally 
define  
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ == *1*
1
*
2
1
2
)(
)(~ mVq
qW
qW
mV
q β
α , then it is easy to see that { }1;0 β  is chosen by all [ ]qqq ~,*1∈  
and { }0;2α  is chosen by all ( ]*2,~ qqq ∈ . Finally, notice that )( 11*1 βqq =  and )( 22*2 αqq = . QED 
 
 
 
